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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Denise Davis appeals her judgment of conviction for embezzlement and theft of 





 Denise Davis was a legal assistant at the U.S. Attorney‟s Office in Newark, New 
Jersey, from 1985 to 2006. During that time, she lived in a low-income public housing 
project in Newark administered by Newark Housing Authority (NHA) and subsidized by 
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. Her housing subsidies 
were calculated based on her income, as reported in her annual applications for continued 
occupancy. In those applications, Davis did not disclose her federal employment and 
falsely represented that she worked at various hair salons. Once her federal employment 
was discovered, Davis submitted altered pay stubs falsely stating she was a part-time 
employee of the U.S. Attorney‟s Office. As a result of Davis‟s misrepresentations, she 
received $113,507 in rent subsidies to which she was not entitled. A grand jury indicted 
Davis on one count of embezzlement and theft of public money and four counts of 
making false statements. 
 At trial, Rosemary Iannacone, an administrative officer at the U.S. Attorney‟s 
Office in Newark, testified that notifications of personnel action showed Davis worked 
there full-time from 1985 to 2006, earning an annual salary that increased from $12,862 
to $46,846 over the course of her employment. An NHA employee testified Davis 
submitted applications for continued occupancy each year from 2003 to 2006 stating she 
was employed at Sapphire‟s hair salon or City Coiffs Hair Salon, earning $175 or $185 
weekly, and, starting in 1999, submitted altered pay stubs and employment verification 
forms from Sapphire‟s and City Coiffs. Ramona Ruth-Hinton, a childhood friend of 
Davis‟s, testified she had written a letter falsely stating Davis was a City Coiffs 
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employee. Davis had requested the letter, stating she needed it for a certification for 
housing. Ruth-Hinton testified she herself had not written or signed the employment 
certification forms from City Coiffs and that the information contained in them was false.  
An NHA employee testified that once she discovered Davis‟s federal employment, 
she asked Davis to come to her office to fill out an income verification form to send to 
the U.S. Attorney‟s Office. Once there, Davis attempted to take the form with her. 
Instead, NHA sent the form directly to the U.S. Attorney‟s Office, which informed NHA 
that it had employed Davis as a legal assistant since March 11, 1985. At the same time, 
Davis submitted an earnings statement of a part-time employee of the U.S. Attorney‟s 
Office as her own. Patrick Reynolds, an information technology specialist at the U.S. 
Attorney‟s Office in Newark, testified that a document containing data from the part-time 
employee‟s earnings statement was discovered on Davis‟s password-protected work 
computer.  
An NHA employee testified the rent NHA charged tenants was thirty percent of 
their adjusted income
1
 or, starting in 1998, if it was lower, a flat rate. The employee 
compared the rent Davis had paid from 1985 to 2006 with the amount she would have 
paid had she accurately reported her federal income, demonstrating a discrepancy of 
$113,507. 
The jury convicted Davis on all counts. Davis was sentenced to fifteen months‟ 
imprisonment. She moved for a new trial, challenging the weight of the evidence and 
                                                 
1
 The adjusted income is the total income of all household members adjusted for 
allowances, such as dependents, disability, medical expenses, or student status. 
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Davis was convicted on four counts of “knowingly and willfully” making a 
“materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” in a matter within 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (18 U.S.C. § 
1001(a)(2)) and one count of “embezzl[ing], steal[ing], purloin[ing], or knowingly 
convert[ing] to h[er] use or the use of another . . . any record, voucher, money, or thing of 
value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof” (18 U.S.C. § 641). 
Davis contends her conviction for making a false statement was against the weight of the 
evidence because “[t]he government failed to offer the testimony of any individual who 
could state, based on personal knowledge, that the four specific certifications and 
applications for continued occupancy i[]dentified in the Superseding Indictment were 
completed or even signed by Ms. Davis.” Appellant‟s Br. at 21. Similarly, Davis 
contends her conviction for embezzlement of public money is against the weight of the 
evidence because “the government failed to offer the testimony of any individual who 
could state, based on personal knowledge, that the documents upon which the NHA 
relied in calculat[ing] rent . . . were completed or even signed by Ms. Davis.” Id. at 23. 
 “Upon the defendant‟s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a 
new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). “A district court 
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can order a new trial on the ground that the jury‟s verdict is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has 
occurred – that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.” United States v. Johnson, 
302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Motions for a new 
trial based on the weight of the evidence are not favored. Such motions are to be granted 
sparingly and only in exceptional cases.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Derricks, 810 F.2d 
50, 55 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 
The District Court did not err by finding the jury‟s verdict was not contrary to the 
weight of the evidence. NHA documents showed Davis‟s applications for rent subsidies 
did not report her federal employment and falsely represented that she was employed at 
Sapphire‟s and City Coiffs, earning significantly less than her federal salary. An NHA 
employee testified Davis‟s submission of these documents resulted in a loss of $113,507 
in government funds. Ruth-Hinton testified Davis asked her to write a letter, for a 
certification for housing, falsely stating Davis worked at City Coiffs. Ruth-Hinton also 
testified she did not write or sign the City Coiffs employment certification forms 
submitted to NHA and the information contained in them was false. An NHA employee 
testified that when she learned that Davis was a federal employee, contrary to the 
information Davis had provided in her NHA applications, Davis attempted to take an 
employer‟s income verification form with her. Davis then submitted an altered earnings 
statement of a part-time employee of the U.S. Attorney‟s Office as her own. Reynolds 
                                                                                                                                                             
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We “review a district court‟s denial of a motion for a new trial for 
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testified data from the part-time employee‟s earnings statement was in a document on 
Davis‟s password-protected computer and Davis could have created the document using 
technology available in the U.S. Attorney‟s Office. 
Davis contends there was insufficient evidence to prove she committed the crimes 
prior to 1999. She is incorrect. The government presented evidence of Davis‟s salaries 
and rent subsidies starting in 1985, when she began her federal employment. An NHA 
employee testified Davis‟s subsidies each year would have been significantly lower had 
she accurately represented her earnings to NHA. The District Court added “that this 
evidence, when considered in conjunction with the fraudulent activity discovered in the 
NHA records from 1999-2006, would enable a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
defendant had been obtaining excessive rent subsidies going back to when she was 
initially employed by the federal government.” United States v. Davis, No. 07-909, 2012 
WL 194094, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2012). 
B. 
 We now address Davis‟s specific claims of trial error.3 
1. 
During a pretrial preparation interview, Ruth-Hinton told the government that she 
                                                                                                                                                             
abuse of discretion.” Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1994). 
3
 We review for abuse of discretion a district court‟s evidentiary rulings, Donlin v. Philips 
Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 80 (3d Cir. 2009), including its limitations on cross-
examination, United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 271 (3d Cir. 2010), admissions 
or exclusions of evidence, United States v. Versaint, 849 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1988), 
and admissions of lay opinion testimony, Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 260. “We review a 
district court‟s decisions regarding jury instructions for abuse of discretion.” United 
States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 167 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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had been arrested and convicted sometime between 1991 and 1995 on a drug-related 
charge but had not reported that information on a job application. The government 
checked Ruth-Hinton‟s criminal history and found no conviction record. The government 
filed an in limine motion to exclude evidence of the conviction. In opposing the motion, 
Davis sought to cross-examine Ruth-Hinton about whether she had lied about her 
conviction, contending it would be probative of her character for truthfulness. The court 
granted the in limine motion, explaining the arrest was remote and there was no 
conviction record or other evidence that Ruth-Hinton had lied. Davis contends, as she did 
in her post-trial motion, that the court erred under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) and 609(b) and 
the Confrontation Clause. Davis is incorrect. 
 District courts have “wide discretion in limiting cross-examination. „A restriction 
will not constitute reversible error unless it is so severe as to constitute a denial of the 
defendant‟s right to confront witnesses against him and it is prejudicial to substantial 
rights of the defendant.‟” United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 918-919 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1100 (3d Cir. 1985)). “[T]he 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not 
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
Under Rule 608(b), “[e]xcept for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness‟s conduct in order to 
attack or support the witness‟s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-
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examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . the witness . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). The District 
Court did not err by finding Ramona-Ruth‟s alleged lies about an over ten-year-old drug 
charge were “far too remote” to be “probative of the witness‟s truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.” Davis, 2012 WL 194094, at *4. The court further found the lies may not 
have occurred “[a]s the drug charge resulted in no criminal record.” Id. 
 Under Rule 609(b), “if more than 10 years have passed since the witness‟s 
conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later[, e]vidence of the 
conviction is admissible” to attack the witness‟s character for truthfulness “only if: (1) its 
probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs 
its prejudicial effect; and (2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written 
notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Davis did not provide the government with the required notice.  
Moreover, the District Court did not err by finding the “the probative value of an 
at least 13-year-old drug charge does not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.” 
Davis, 2012 WL 194094, at *4. As noted, the court explained the drug charge, which 
occurred “over 10 years ago . . . [and] resulted in no criminal record, is so remote that . . .  
its minimal probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion of the 
issues to the jury.” Id. For the same reasons, the court did not err when it found admission 
of the evidence was not required under the Confrontation Clause. See Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. at 679 (“[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned to impose reasonable limits on [defense counsel‟s] cross-examination based on 
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concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 
witness‟ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”). 
2. 
 During Iannacone‟s cross-examination, Davis sought to introduce four 
notifications of personnel action, which the government had not introduced on direct 
examination, showing that after Davis appealed the decision of the U.S. Attorney‟s 
Office to suspend her indefinitely without pay in 2006, the U.S. Attorney‟s Office 
revoked her suspension and allowed her to resign. The government objected on relevance 
grounds. Davis responded that the rule of completeness required the introduction of the 
additional notices to complete her personnel file and show she had resigned. The court 
sustained the objection, explaining “the rule of completeness does not obviate the need 
for relevance,” and the outcome of the administrative process was irrelevant to the 
criminal matter at hand. Davis contends, as she did in her post-trial motion, that the court 
erred by sustaining the government‟s objection. Davis is incorrect. 
Fed. R. Evid. 106 provides the rule of completeness: “If a party introduces all or 
part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at 
that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded statement--that in fairness 
ought to be considered at the same time.” Under this rule, “a second writing may be 
required to be read if it is necessary to (1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the 
admitted portion in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and 
impartial understanding.” United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984). “[T]he 
district court has broad discretion to conduct the trial in an orderly and efficient manner, 
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and to choose among reasonable evidentiary alternatives to satisfy the rule of 
completeness reflected in Rule 106.” United States v. Webber, 255 F.3d 523, 526 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Abroms, 947 F.2d 1241, 1250 (5th Cir. 1991)).  
As the District Court found, “[t]he individual Notifications of Personnel Action 
that the Government introduced were discrete documents” used “to prove that Davis was 
employed by the federal government and to show the amount of her federal income.” 
Davis, 2012 WL 194094, at *5. They did not include any information about Davis‟s 
suspension or termination from the U.S. Attorney‟s Office. Accordingly, information that 
Davis had resigned would not have explained the admitted documents. Furthermore, the 
additional notifications were irrelevant because they merely reflected the outcome of an 
administrative process. 
3. 
At trial, Reynolds testified he had searched Davis‟s computer, on behalf of the 
U.S. Attorney‟s Office, and had found a WordPerfect document called “spread chart” that 
“look[ed] like a spreadsheet.” The document contained identical data to that appearing on 
a part-time employee‟s earnings statement. Reynolds testified that at the time the 
document was created, the U.S. Attorney‟s Office had scanners that would save scanned 
documents as Adobe PDF files on employees‟ computers. The computers had software 
that could convert Adobe PDF files into WordPerfect files. The conversion software at 
the time “wasn‟t good,” and it often converted graphics into random characters. The 
government asked Reynolds whether, “based on your experience using the Adobe 
software and scanning,” the appearance of the “spread chart” WordPerfect file was 
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“consistent with what would happen if a document like [the earnings statement] were 
scanned?” Davis objected that Reynolds, as a lay witness, was not qualified to answer the 
question. The government responded that Reynolds was very familiar with the software 
in question and was being asked a question he could answer from personal experience. 
The court agreed and overruled the objection. Reynolds testified the horizontal and 
vertical lines in the earnings statement could have produced the characters in the “spread 
chart” WordPerfect file. Davis contends, as she did in her post-trial motion, that the court 
should not have permitted Reynolds to testify about the document because he did not 
have personal knowledge about it and was not qualified as an expert. Davis is incorrect.  
Lay witnesses may provide opinion testimony that is “(a) rationally based on the 
witness‟s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness‟s testimony or to 
determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701.  
This [rule] does not mean that an expert is always necessary 
whenever the testimony is of a specialized or technical nature. When a lay 
witness has particularized knowledge by virtue of her experience, she may 
testify – even if the subject matter is specialized or technical – because the 
testimony is based upon the layperson‟s personal knowledge rather than on 
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
 
Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 2009). Trial courts 
have broad discretion to admit or exclude opinion testimony. Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 
484 F.3d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 The District Court did not err when it found Reynolds‟s “testimony was 
permissible because it fell within his personal knowledge based upon his day-to-day 
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knowledge as an employee in the IT department, and because he was testifying about 
inferences he could draw from the documents.” Davis, 2012 WL 194094, at *6. See 
United States v. Polishan, 336 F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A witness testifying about 
business operations may testify about „inferences that he could draw from his perception‟ 
of a business‟s records, or „facts or data perceived‟ by him in his corporate capacity.”) 
(quoting Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403, 404 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
Reynolds testified the “spread chart” document “look[ed] like a spreadsheet,” and the 
technology available in the U.S. Attorney‟s office at the time the document was created 
would have allowed an employee to scan a document, save it as a PDF file, and convert it 
into a WordPerfect file that might have contained characters like those appearing in the 
“spread chart” document. As the District Court found, Reynolds “was not asked to offer a 
specific opinion as to whether the document” itself “was created using that process – he 
was merely testifying as to a hypothetical” that it could have been created using that 
process. Davis, 2012 WL 194094, at *6. We see no abuse of discretion. 
4. 
In its jury instructions, the trial court explained that to find Davis guilty of making 
false statements: 
The first element . . . that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt [is] that the defendant made a statement or representation. There is no 
distinction between oral and written statements. The Government need not 
prove that the defendant physically made or otherwise personally prepared 
the statement in question. It is sufficient if she caused the statement charged 
against her to have been made.  
 
The court also explained parties may introduce handwriting evidence to prove the identity 
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of the person who committed a crime: 
To do this, a party may present a known sample of a person‟s handwriting, 
one that is proved to come from that person. This known handwriting 
sample is then compared with any other handwriting samples being 
introduced to prove who committed the crime. . . . If you find that . . . [the] 
documents [produced by NHA] do not bear [Davis‟s] actual signature, you 
may disregard such evidence. . . . 
 
During deliberations, the jury asked the court “[i]f the signatures do not match, 
does that make the defendant not guilty? Does it have significance [i]n the case?” Davis 
suggested that the court, in response, repeat its handwriting jury instruction. The 
government responded “[t]here w[as] more than one instruction you gave regarding the 
signature,” and suggested that the court also repeat its instruction regarding making a 
false statement. The court agreed with the government, and repeated both instructions to 
the jury. It explained to the jury “it‟s up to you to determine, from your evaluation of the 
evidence, which [instruction] you should follow.” 
Davis contends the District Court improperly responded to a jury inquiry by 
repeating both instructions and stating it was for the jury to decide, based on its 
evaluation of the evidence, which to apply. Davis does not contend the court‟s response 
was incorrect but states it did not “directly answer the question[] asked,” Appellant‟s Br. 
at 8, and was “confusing.” Id. at 19. Davis is incorrect. As the District Court explained, 
The Court[‟s] . . . response to the jury inquiry was appropriate 
because the jury specifically asked whether matching the defendant‟s 
signature was required to find the defendant guilty. The first instruction told 
the jury that it could use its discretion and disregard evidence regarding the 
signatures in rendering its verdict. It was important for the jury to receive 
clarification that, whether or not the evidence was disregarded, it could still 





Davis, 2012 WL 194094, at *7. See Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 167 (“We will order a new 
trial on account of a district court‟s refusal to give a proposed jury instruction „only when 
the requested instruction was correct, not substantially covered by the instructions given, 
and was so consequential that the refusal to give the instruction was prejudicial to the 
defendant.‟”) (quoting United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 651 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
Davis also contends the court‟s response “could have very well made it possible 
for the jury to have convicted [her] without finding [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Appellant‟s Br. at 19-20. The court did not err when it rejected this contention, as its 
instruction on making a false statement “specifically stressed the importance of this high 
legal standard” by stating “„the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt‟ that 
the defendant made the representations.” Davis, 2012 WL 194094, at *7. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.   
